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JUNK SCIENCE AND THE EXECUTION 
OF AN INNOCENT MAN 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
“The only statement I want to make is that I am an innocent 
man convicted of a crime I did not commit. I have been persecuted 
for twelve years for something I did not do.” — Cameron Todd 
Willingham’s words before his execution.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two-year-old Amber Willingham, along with her younger twin 
sisters, Karmon and Kameron, died in a fire on December 23, 1991 
in Corsicana, Texas. Their father Cameron Todd Willingham es-
caped from the fire, was tried, and eventually executed for their 
deaths. The expert testimony offered against him to prove arson 
                                                          
 
 
 
* Distinguished University Professor & Weatherhead Professor, Case Western Re-
serve University; J.D., 1970, LL.M. 1975, University of Virginia; M.S. Forensic Science, 
1973, George Washington University. 
1 See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 63. 
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was “junk science.”2 The case has since become infamous—the sub-
ject of an award-winning New Yorker article,3 numerous newspa-
per accounts, 4  and several television shows. 5  It also became en-
meshed in the death penalty debate6 and the reelection of Texas 
Governor Rick Perry, who refused to grant a stay of execution after 
a noted expert submitted a report debunking the arson “science” 
offered at Willingham’s trial.7 The Governor later attempted to de-
                                                          
 
 
 
2 Christy Hoppe, Some Experts Question Science in Texas Arson Cases, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (W. VA.), Sept. 20, 2009, at 11A (“Arson investigators in Tex-
as have relied on old wives’ tales and junk science to send men to prison, and per-
haps even the death chamber, top experts on fire behavior say.”). 
3 See Grann, supra note 1. Grann’s article won the 2009 George Polk Award for 
Magazine Reporting, the America Bar Association’s 2010 Silver Gavel Award for 
Media and the Arts, and the 2009 Sigma Delta Chi Award for magazine investigative 
reporting from the Society of Professional Journalists. 
4 See, e.g., Jennifer Emily, Texas Forensic Science Commission Refuses to End Inquiry 
into Willingham Arson Case, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 2010; Steve Mills & Mau-
rice Possley, Texas Man Executed on Disproved Forensics: Fire that Killed his 3 Children 
Could Have Been Accidental, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2004, at C1; Steve Mills, Texas May Have 
Put Innocent Man to Death, Panel Told; Nobody Would Listen, Lawyer, Expert Say, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 20, 2005, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-04-
20/news/0504200146_1_cameron-todd-willingham-willingham-case-gerald-hurst. 
5 See Frontline: Death by Fire (PBS television broadcast Oct. 19, 2010); Nightline 
(ABC television broadcast Sept. 17, 2009). A documentary film, Incendiary, has also 
been released. 
6 See Emily, supra note 4 (“The Willingham case has drawn worldwide attention 
from death-penalty opponents and others since questions were raised about the in-
tegrity of the science evidence used to convict him of murder.”). Justice Scalia once 
wrote: “It should be noted at the outset that the dissent does not discuss a single 
case—not one—in which it is clear that a person was executed for a crime he did not 
commit. If such an event had occurred in recent years, we would not have to hunt for 
it; the innocent’s name would be shouted from the rooftops by the abolition lobby.” 
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 188 (2006). 
7 See Mary Alice Robbins, Fired Up: Changes Sought for Texas Forensic Science Com-
mission at Center of Heated Controversy, 25 TEX. LAWYER, Nov. 9, 2009 (“Anti-death 
penalty activists have contended that Willingham was innocent and that [Governor] 
Perry replaced the commission members to block a review of a report questioning 
whether the fire Willingham was accused of starting was arson.”). 
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rail an investigation by the Texas Forensic Science Commission into 
the arson evidence presented at Willingham’s trial.8 
Whatever else the Willingham case may stand for, it is a trench-
ant illustration of the judicial acceptance of expert testimony devoid 
of empirical support and the legal system’s inability to effectively 
police such testimony. The National Academy of Science’s land-
mark 2009 report on forensic science, Strengthening Forensic Science 
in the United States: A Path Forward, made the breathtaking observa-
tion that, “[a]mong existing forensic methods, only nuclear DNA 
analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consist-
ently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection 
between an evidentiary sample and a specific individual or 
source.”9 The report went on to observe: “In a number of forensic 
science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to estab-
lish either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their 
conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in address-
ing this problem.”10 Moreover, recent studies document the role 
that forensic science played in convicting the innocent. 11  The 
                                                          
 
 
 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 100–15. 
9 Nat’l Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward 100 (2009). 
10 Id. at 53 (emphasis added). The Report devotes only two paragraphs to arson 
investigations: “Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators continue to 
make determinations about whether or not a particular fire was set. However, ac-
cording to testimony presented to the committee, many of the rules of thumb that are 
typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant was used (e.g., ‘alligatoring’ of 
wood, specific char patterns) have been shown not to be true. Experiments should be 
designed to put arson investigations on a more solid scientific footing.” Id. at 173 (emphasis 
added).  
11 A study of 200 DNA exonerations found that forensic evidence (fifty-five per-
cent) was the second leading type of evidence (after eyewitness identifications, sev-
enty-nine percent) used in the wrongful conviction cases. Of the types of forensic 
evidence introduced at trial, “serological analysis of blood or semen [was] the most 
common (79 cases), followed by expert comparison of hair evidence (43 cases), soil 
comparison (5 cases), DNA tests (3 cases), bite mark evidence (3 cases), fingerprint 
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Willingham case also highlights the corrosive effect of death-
penalty politics—the extraordinary lengths a state has undertaken 
to avoid investigating the possibility that it had executed an inno-
cent man.   
 
II. THE TRIAL 
A.  THE ARSON EVIDENCE 
Willingham’s capital trial began in August 1992. Proclaiming 
his innocence from the beginning, Willingham refused to plead 
guilty in exchange for life imprisonment in lieu of the death penal-
ty.12 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
evidence (2 cases), dog scent (2 cases), spectrographic voice evidence (1 case), shoe 
prints (1 case) and fiber comparison (1 case).” Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 81 (2008). See also Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Inva-
lid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2009) 
(“Of the 100 cases involving serology in which transcripts were located, 57 cases, or 
57%, had invalid forensic science testimony. Of the 65 cases involving microscopic 
hair comparison in which transcripts were located, 25 cases, or 38%, had invalid 
forensic science testimony.”); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic 
Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007) (discussing lab 
scandals in West Virginia, Oklahoma City, Chicago, Houston, Virginia, Montana, 
and the FBI Lab). 
12 Willingham’s court-appointed trial attorneys, John Martin and Robert Dunn, 
advised him to accept the offer, but he refused. “Willingham was implacable. ‘I ain’t 
gonna plead to something I didn’t do, especially killing my own kids,’ he said. It was 
his final decision. Martin says, ‘I thought it was nuts at the time—and I think it’s nuts 
now.’” Grann, supra note 1, at 48. “Though his father did not believe that he should 
plead guilty if he were innocent, his stepmother beseeched him to take the deal. ‘I 
just wanted to keep my boy alive,’ she told me.” Id. 
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1.   Arson Investigations  
The arson evidence was critical. No arson, no crime.13 The pros-
ecution proffered two experts: Manuel Vasquez, a deputy state fire 
marshal, and Douglas Fogg, an assistant fire chief in Corsicana.14 
With years of experience, they came from the “old school” of inves-
tigators—those who used intuition and a number of rules of thumb 
to determine whether a fire was incendiary.15 In Vasquez’s words: 
“The fire tells a story. I am just the interpreter. . . . And the fire does 
not lie. It tells me the truth.”16  
Critics of this approach complained that it lacked a scientific 
foundation. Rather, it was based on folklore that had been passed 
down from generation to generation without any empirical test-
ing.17 As early as 1977, a government report noted that common 
arson indicators had “received little or no scientific testing” and 
“[t]here appears to be no published material in the scientific litera-
ture to substantiate their validity.”18 Through the 1980s, proponents 
of a science-based approach to arson investigations waged an uphill 
battle, finally winning a major victory in 1992 when the National 
                                                          
 
 
 
13  See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE ch. 26 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing legal and scientific issues associated with 
arson evidence). 
14 Under state law, the Texas State Fire Marshal is responsible for investigating 
suspicious fires. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 417.007 (West 2004). 
15 “Often, the bulk of an investigator’s training came on the job, learning from 
‘old-timers’ in the field, who passed down a body of wisdom about the telltale signs 
of arson . . . .” Grann, supra note 1, at 58.  
16 Transcript of Statement of Facts, State v. Willingham, (Tex.13th D. 1991) (No. 
24240-CR) (vol. XI), at 244 [hereinafter Willingham Transcript], aff’d, Willingham v. 
State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 
17 See JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION ch. 8 (2006) 
(discussing myths of arson investigations). 
18 J.F. Boudreau et al., National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Arson and Arson 
Investigation: A Survey and Assessment 88 (1977). 
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Fire Protection Association (NFPA) published its Guide for Fire and 
Explosion Investigations (NFPA 921).19 Although NFPA 921 would 
subsequently become the bible in fire and arson investigations,20 it 
was published weeks after Willingham’s trial.  
 
2.  The Willingham Fire 
Deputy Fire Marshal Vasquez told the jury that he had found 
twenty indicators of arson during his post-fire investigation of 
Willingham’s house.21 One indicator was a low burning fire.22 “All 
fire goes up,” Vasquez testified.23 Thus, burn patterns on the lower 
walls and floor suggested that an accelerant was used.24 
                                                          
 
 
 
19  NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
INVESTIGATION (1992). The NFPA promotes fire prevention and safety. The most 
recent edition of NFPA 921 was published in 2011.  
20 See United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 109 n.39 (D. Mass. 2010) (NFPA 
921 “is widely accepted as the standard guide in the field of fire investigation.”); 
Thomas M. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit: 
Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue?, 16 RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 1, 
5 (2010) (noting that NFPA 921 has “become the de facto national standard for fire 
scene examination and analysis”). 
21 Assistant Chief Fogg’s testimony essentially tracked Vasquez’s. 
22 Vasquez testified that there was “char burning, like, for example, this is the bot-
tom here. It’s burned down here at the bottom. That is an indicator in my investiga-
tion of an origin of fire because it’s the lowest part of the fire.” Willingham tran-
script, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 239. See also Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“An expert witness for the State testified that the floors, front 
threshold, and front concrete porch were burned, which only occurs when an accel-
erant has been used to purposely burn these areas. This witness further testified that 
this igniting of the floors and thresholds is typically employed to impede firemen in 
their rescue attempts.”). 
23 Willingham transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 232.  
24 “So when I found that the floor is hotter than the ceiling, that’s backwards, up-
side down. It shouldn’t be like that. The only reason that the floor is hotter is because 
there was an accelerant.” Id. at 256. 
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This common-sense notion, however, has its limitations, espe-
cially when a fire occurs in a contained area, such as a house. Due to 
buoyancy, a thermal plume initially rises once a fire is ignited. As 
the fire continues, the plume reaches the ceiling, which causes it to 
spread outward towards the walls. When it reaches the walls, the 
combustion products press down from the ceiling creating an upper 
level, which continues to increase in depth and temperature. Even-
tually thermal radiation replaces convection as the principal meth-
od of heat transfer. When the temperature of the hot gas layer 
reaches approximately 1100-1200 degrees Fahrenheit, every ex-
posed combustible surface in the room will burst into flames. This 
phenomenon, known as “flashover,” can occur within minutes. Af-
ter flashover, the entire room is engulfed in flames, including the 
lower walls and floor.25 Flashover, according to one authority, is the 
point at which the fire transitions from a “fire in a room” to a “room 
on fire.”26 Consequently, a low burning fire is not necessarily indic-
ative of an incendiary origin.  
Moreover, some of Vasquez’s other “indicators”—splotchy 
looking areas called “puddle configurations” and “pour patterns”—
are present after flashover in an accidental fire.27 Similarly, addi-
tional indicators such as “alligatoring” marks on wood (char blis-
ters) are explained by flashover. Flashover also accounts for another 
fact that Vasquez thought incriminatory. Willingham told investiga-
                                                          
 
 
 
25 See id. at 75 (“The windows, the electricity started crackling and popping, and 
the top of the well—well, I was facing the side of the house, and it just blew out. The 
flames just blew out. . . . All the windows and the front room was engulfed.”) (testi-
mony of Dianne Barbe); id. at 96 (“We was running towards the house, me and my 
mother, we was fixing to go and try to get in, and that’s when it was an explosion . . . 
.”) (testimony of Brandy Barbe). Vasquez mentioned flashover in his testimony (See 
id. vol. XII. at 47–48), but he does not appear to understand its implications.  
26 LENTINI, supra note 17, at 68–70. 
27 According to Vasquez, a burn “trailer” was etched on the floor. Willingham 
Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 244 (“You can see that on the burnt patterns on 
this puddle configuration on Exhibit No. 36. This is a strong indicator of a liquid.”). 
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tors that he had attempted to save his daughters, but the heat was 
too great and he was forced to run from the house without shoes. 
Willingham’s feet were not burnt, and in Vasquez’s mind, burnt 
debris on the floor made that impossible.28 However, if Willingham 
left his home before flashover, his feet would not have been burnt. 
(Willingham exaggerated his attempts to save his children—a 
common occurrence when a parent survives a fatal fire.) 
Still another clue was charring under an aluminum threshold of 
an interior door. Here, again, this may occur in a flashover. Still 
other arson indicators—melted bedsprings, 29  multiple points of 
origin,30 and brown stains on a concrete floor31—are also consistent 
with an accidental blaze.32 In addition, Vasquez relied on the pres-
ence of “crazed glass”—spider-web patterns on the windows as an 
                                                          
 
 
 
28 “There was fire on the floor. . . . He had no injuries on his feet.” Id. at 267. 
29 “[T]he springs were burned from underneath. This indicates there was a fire 
under this bed because of the burn underneath the bed.” Id. at 241.   
30 “Multiple areas of origin indicate—especially if there is no connecting path, that 
they were intentionally set by human hands.” Id. at 255. There are two problems 
here. First, the fire scene did not exhibit multiple origins, according to independent 
experts. See DOUGLAS CARPENTER ET AL., REPORT ON THE PEER REVIEW OF THE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS V. CAMERON TODD WILLINGHAM AND 
STATE OF TEXAS V. EARNEST RAY WILLIS 11–12 (2006). Second, even if the fire scene 
had shown multiple points of origin, this would not necessarily indicate an inten-
tional fire. LENTINI, supra note 17, at 461–62. 
31 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 248–49. Fire experts reviewing 
the evidence from Willingham’s trial pointed out that “[t]he behavior of concrete in 
fires, including the development of various colors, has been extensively studied.” 
CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 18. These experts concluded that there is simply 
“no scientific basis for Mr. Vasquez’s statement about the brown discoloration being 
an indication of the presence of accelerants.” Id. 
32 Vasquez’s testimony also demonstrated other misconceptions. A common one 
is that arson fires burn hotter and faster than “normal” fires: “You know, it makes 
the fire hotter. It’s not a normal fire.” Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 
249. However, the temperature of burning wood and burning gasoline are nearly 
identical, so to claim that a fire using liquid accelerants burns “hotter” than a wood 
fire is wrong. LENTINI, supra note 17, at 465. 
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indication of arson.33 It was long believed that crazed glass resulted 
from a fire that burned fast and hot—i.e., one fueled by a liquid ac-
celerant. Yet, subsequent research demonstrated that crazing occurs 
only from rapid cooling when water from fire hoses is sprayed on 
heated windows.34 
In retrospect, the most damning piece of evidence involved one 
of the numerous debris samples submitted for laboratory analysis.35 
It came from an area near the front door and was the only sample 
that tested positive for a chemical commonly used in charcoal light-
er fluids. Nevertheless, this finding can be explained by the fact that 
a charcoal grill and lighter fluid were on the front porch at the time 
of the fire.36 Eyewitnesses reported no fire at the front door when 
they first saw Willingham on the porch. In fact, the negative results 
from the other samples support Willingham’s case.37 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
33 “The pieces of broken window glass on the ledge of the north windows to the 
northeast bedroom disclosed a crazed ‘spider webbing’ condition. This condition is 
an indication that the fire burned fast and hot.” CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 
18 (citing Vasquez’s written report on the Willingham fire). 
34 LENTINI, supra note 17, at 439 (“It is unclear why anyone ever thought that crazing 
of glass indicated rapid heating.”). 
35  In closing argument, the defense counsel referred to a “dozen samples.” 
Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XIII, at 20. 
36 Id., vol. XII, at 15 (although photographs show a grill, Vasquez apparently did 
not know of the grill’s presence); id. at 16 (acknowledging that a fire-damaged char-
coal lighter fluid container was found on the front porch).  
37  The prosecutor would later say that he “‘never did understand why they 
weren’t able to recover’ positive tests in these parts.” Grann, supra note 1, at 61. At 
trial, he argued that the “liquid burned away in that destructive madness created by 
Cameron Todd Willingham.” Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XIII, at 45.  
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The cause of the fire remains unknown,38 and the scene cannot 
be reconstructed due in part to the disappearance of records.39 
 
3.  Credibility Testimony 
 Vasquez did not limit himself to an opinion on the cause of the 
fire. He also testified that Willingham was not truthful, informing 
the jury that during an interview Willingham “told me a story of 
pure fabrication”40 and, “[h]e just talked and he talked and all he 
did was lie.”41 This testimony was improper and extremely prejudi-
cial. Vasquez was accepted by the court as an arson investigator, 
not as an expert on credibility. He was thus testifying beyond his 
                                                          
 
 
 
38 Willingham’s defense suggested at trial that Amber, the two-year old, could 
have caused the fire by knocking over a kerosene lamp. This seems like speculation. 
In his 2009 New Yorker article, Grann raised another theory—a space heater in the 
children’s bed room—which was never confirmed. Both Willingham and his wife, 
Stacy, had warned Amber not to play with it. Willingham told investigators that 
“[h]e and Stacy used three space heaters to keep the house warm, and one of them 
was in the children’s room. ‘I taught Amber not to play with it,’ he said, adding that 
she got ‘whuppings every once in a while for messing with it.’” Grann, supra note 1, 
at 46. Although Vasquez testified that the heater was off when he inspected the 
premises four days after the fire, Stacy said it was on when she left the house on the 
morning of the fire. Elizabeth Gilbert, who befriended Willingham in 2000 when he 
was on death row, eventually began to investigate his case after initially believing 
that he was guilty. During this process, she conducted a taped interview with Stacy: 
“Stacy was sure that, at least on the day of the incident—a cool winter morning—it 
had been on. ‘I remember turning it down,’ she recalled. ‘I always thought, Gosh, 
could Amber have put something there?’ Stacy added that, more than once, she had 
caught Amber ‘putting things too close to it.’” Id. at 51.  
39  REPORT OF THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMM’N, WILLINGHAM/WILLIS 
INVESTIGATION 21 (April 15, 2011) (hereinafter TFSC REPORT) (“Although the [Cor-
sicana Fire Department] informed the Commission that a thorough examination was 
conducted, the documentation provided to the District Attorney no longer exists.”). 
40 Willingham Transcript supra note 16, vol. XI, at 258.  
41 Id. at 260.  
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expertise.42 Indeed, it is axiomatic that witnesses, lay and expert, are 
not permitted to testify about credibility.43 Moreover, research sug-
gests that police and other investigators are not all that good at 
judging credibility: “Unfortunately, psychological research has gen-
erally failed to support the claim that individuals [such as CIA, FBI, 
and police investigators] can attain high levels of performance in 
making judgments of truth and deception. Over the years, numer-
ous studies have demonstrated that these individuals perform at no 
better than chance level in detecting deception.”44  
                                                          
 
 
 
42 In addition to a lack of expertise, some courts cite the jury’s historic role as a 
reason for rejecting opinions on credibility. In rejecting polygraph evidence, for ex-
ample, Justice Thomas wrote of the importance of “[p]reserving the court members’ 
core function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials. A fundamental 
premise of our criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’” United States 
v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 312-13 (1998) (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 
907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973). Justice Thomas further stated: “Determining the weight and 
credibility of witness testimony, therefore, has long been held to be the ‘part of every 
case [that] belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural 
intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’” Id. at 113 
(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)) (alteration in original). 
43 See Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 1995) (“expert testimony 
going to the issue of credibility is not admissible”); United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 
131 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[A]n expert’s opinion that another witness is lying or telling the 
truth is ordinarily inadmissible . . . because the opinion exceeds the scope of the ex-
pert’s specialized knowledge and therefore merely informs the jury that it should 
reach a particular conclusion.”). 
44 Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judg-
ments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 (2002); see also Saul M. 
Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident But Erroneous, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 811 (2002):  
Surprisingly, however, professionals who regularly make these kinds of 
[truth-determination] judgments for a living, like the rest of us, are highly 
prone to error. In one study, researchers Paul Ekman and Maureen 
O’Sullivan were curious to know whether groups of so-called experts—
such as police investigators; CIA, FBI, and military polygraph examiners; 
trial judges; psychiatrists; and U.S. Secret Service Agents—are truly better 
than the average person. Using stimulus materials from past studies—
consisting of true and false stories—they found that college students had a 
52.8 percent accuracy rate, which is pretty typical. Police detectives were 
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Remarkably, Vasquez also testified that Willingham’s “intent 
was to kill the little girls.”45 Here, again, the testimony was far be-
yond his expertise. A qualified arson investigator may be able to 
determine whether a fire was intentionally set but not why it was 
set—i.e., whether it was set for insurance money, vengeance, etc. 
Other parts of Vasquez’s testimony were also beyond the scope of a 
fire investigator’s expertise. For example, he claimed that Willing-
ham’s injuries, including singed eyelids and hair, were self-
inflected.46  
 
B. JAILHOUSE INFORMANT 
Johnny Webb, a jailhouse informant, was another prosecution 
witness.47 For obvious reasons, jailhouse snitches are notoriously 
unreliable. As Judge Trott, a former prosecutor, has observed, “[t]he 
most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims 
another prisoner has confessed to him.”48 According to the Inno-
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
only slightly higher, at 55.8 percent; CIA, FBI, and military polygraph ex-
aminers were at 55.7 percent, trial judges were at 56.7 percent, and psychi-
atrists were at 57.6 percent. U.S. Secret Service Agent[s] won the prize, ex-
hibiting a 64 percent accuracy rate, the highest of all groups. 
45 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XII, at 54.  
46 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 262 (“In my opinion, they are 
self-inflicted.”). Vasquez also testified that Willingham did not suffer smoke inhala-
tion. Id. at 265. He had no firsthand knowledge of Willingham’s condition immedi-
ately after the fire. He started his investigation on December 27, four days after the 
fire. Id. at 229. 
47 See Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“Johnny 
Webb, a State’s witness, testified that appellant confessed to him that he committed 
the offense; that appellant explained in detail how he poured lighter fluid through-
out the house, purposely burned one of the children, set the house on fire, fled, and 
refused to go back into the house to rescue the children.”). 
48 Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1394 (1996); see also ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 65 (2002) (“[Leslie Vernon 
2013]      Junk Science and the Execution of An Innocent Man   
 
 
233 
cence Project, such testimony appeared in eighteen percent of the 
cases in which convicts were subsequently exonerated by DNA pro-
filing.49 
Like many informants, Webb was a drug addict (crack cocaine) 
who had a criminal record (aggravated robbery, car theft, selling 
marijuana, theft, and forgery). 50  He also suffered from post-
traumatic stress disorder as a result of a prison rape. Indeed, during 
cross-examination Webb claimed that he could not remember the 
crime for which he pled guilty (aggravated robbery): “I could have 
done it, but I do not remember doing it.”51 Webb, who was serving 
a fifteen-year sentence, testified that no promises had been made to 
him, which in itself is suspect. Implied inducements to informants 
are well known in criminal practice.52 Five years later the prosecu-
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
White] admitted to consistently fabricating confessions of fellow inmates and offer-
ing perjured testimony to courts.”); JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER 
AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN 196-98 (2006) (discussing the snitch testimony of 
Terri Holland in the Ron Williamson case; Williamson was later exonerated by 
DNA); NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
THE SNITCH SYSTEM 3 (2004), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf (noting that 
snitch cases account for 45.9% of the 111 death row exonerations since the death 
penalty was restored in the 1970s; most were jailhouse informants); Vesna Jaksic, 
Calif. May Crack Down on Use of Jailhouse Informants, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 20, 2006, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005469907&Calif_may_crac
k_down_on_use_of_jailhouse_informants (reporting that the California Commission 
on the Fair Administration of Justice issued guidelines on the use of jailhouse in-
formants; and that of the 117 death penalty appeals pending in the California State 
Public Defender office, seventeen involved testimony by in-custody informants and 
six involved testimony by informants in constructive custody).  
49  Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exoner
ations.php, (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
50 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 13-14, 26-27 (testimony of John-
ny Webb). 
51 Id. at 23. 
52 As one court wrote: “We are not unaware of the reality that the Government has 
ways of indicating to witness’s counsel the likely benefits from cooperation without 
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tor asked the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant Webb 
parole.53  
Moreover, Webb’s assertions were inherently problematic. He 
was not Willingham’s cellmate. Instead, Webb claimed Willingham 
told him, a virtual stranger, of his misdeeds through a hole in a steel 
door in Willingham’s cell. Yet, Willingham went to his grave pro-
claiming his innocence. Webb also asserted that Willingham said he 
started the fire to hide his wife’s abuse of their children;54 there was 
no evidence that Willingham or his wife, Stacy, ever abused their 
children. Later, Webb recanted his testimony and then retracted the 
recantation. A journalist would later recount an interview with 
Webb: “After I pressed him, [Webb] said, ‘It’s very possible I mis-
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
making bald promises . . . .” United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1266 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also R. 
Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of 
Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2004) (“The Court’s decision in 
Giglio has created an incentive for prosecutors to make representations to an accom-
plice witness that are vague and open-ended, so that they will not be considered a 
firm ‘promise’ mandating disclosure. . . . Such indefinite agreements have the added 
advantage of allowing prosecutors to argue to the jury that no specific promise has 
been made to the witness; this is viewed as tactically more advantageous to the gov-
ernment because it prevents the factfinder from second-guessing the appropriateness 
of concessions ultimately conferred.”). Another authority put it this way: 
To enhance the credibility of his testimony, an informant often testified 
that there have been no promises of benefits made to them in return for 
their testimony. Even though nothing may be explicitly stated, both the 
prosecutor and the informant knew that there will be some compensation 
for the testimony. “The practice (of promising rewards) was done by a 
wink and a nod and it was never necessary to have any kind of formal un-
derstanding.” 
Bloom, supra note 48, at 66 (citing Los Angeles County Grand Jury, Investigation of 
the Involvement of Jail House Informants in the Criminal Justice System in Los An-
geles County 39 (1990); Ted Rohrlich, Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years; Crime: Informant 
Blew the Whistle on Use of Jailhouse Liar-for-Hire, but No Law Officers Were Charged for 
Conspiring with Him, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at B1 (quoting Douglas Dalton, special 
counsel to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury)). 
53 Grann, supra note 1, at 52. 
54 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 18 (testimony of Johnny Webb). 
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understood what [Willingham] said.” . . . He paused, then said, ‘The 
statute of limitations has run out on perjury, hasn’t it?’”55 
 
C. DEMEANOR EVIDENCE  
The other type of evidence involved Willingham’s behavior—
that is, testimony that he made insufficient efforts to save his chil-
dren and did not show sufficient grief at the hospital or the next 
day.56 The prosecution emphasized this in his final argument.57 Not 
surprisingly, the evidence regarding the fire scene is somewhat con-
flicting. Several neighbors, who testified for the prosecution, 
acknowledged that Willingham “was hollering. He was screaming 
the babies was in there.”58 A paramedic testified that Willingham 
                                                          
 
 
 
55 Grann, supra note 1, at 52. 
56 See Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995): 
Neighbors of appellant testified that as the house began smoldering, ap-
pellant was “crouched down” in the front yard, and despite the neighbors’ 
pleas, refused to go into the house in any attempt to rescue the chil-
dren. . . . The testimony at trial demonstrates that appellant neither 
showed remorse for his actions nor grieved the loss of his three children. 
Appellant’s neighbors testified that when the fire “blew out” the windows, 
appellant “hollered about his car” and ran to move it away from the fire to 
avoid its being damaged. A fire fighter also testified that appellant was 
upset [the next day] that his dart board was burned. One of appellant’s 
neighbors testified that the morning following the house fire, Christmas 
Eve, appellant and his wife were at the burned house going through the 
debris while playing music and laughing. 
In prison, Willingham said he moved the car because he was afraid it would catch on 
fire and explode. Grann, supra note 1, at 50. See also Mills & Possley, supra note 4 (one 
juror “said she would have found Willingham guilty even without the arson finding 
solely because he did not try to save his children.”). 
57 Willingham transcript, supra note 16, vol. XIII, at 43-44. 
58 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 72 (testimony of Dianne Barbe, 
neighbor of Willingham). See also id. at 88 (testimony of Brandy Barbe, neighbor of 
Willingham) (“He was screaming that there was fire, that his babies were burning 
and for someone to help him, to call 911.”); id. at 103 (testimony of Buffy Barbe, 
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was “really excited” and “hysterical.”59 A police officer stated that 
Willingham was “upset” and “[w]e had to end up restraining him a 
little bit.”60 There was also testimony that Willingham had attempt-
ed to reenter the house by breaking several windows.61 
The reactions of persons to traumatic events are far too varied 
to place much weight on their demeanor, and this includes survi-
vors of fires.62 Further, this evidence changed over time, becoming 
more damaging after the investigators became convinced that 
Willingham was an arsonist.63 Once witnesses learn of investigators’ 
suspicions, it is not unusual for their testimony to harden and be-
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
neighbor of Willingham) (“He was hollering, ‘My babies are inside burning up. Help 
me.’”). 
59 Id. at 128, 132 (testimony of Ronald Franks). 
60 Id. at 149 (testimony of Jason Grant). 
61 Id. at 104 (testimony of Buffy Barbe, neighbor of Willingham). 
62 The fire “experts who reviewed the case didn’t put any stock in the claims that 
Willingham’s behavior was damning. They say experience shows that there is no 
way to predict how people will react in a fire or to the grief of losing loved ones.” 
Mills & Possley, supra note 4. The literature on rape trauma syndrome also illustrates 
this point. There is no typical way that a rape victim will react. Some victims are 
hysterical; others are calm. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 13, § 9.03 (dis-
cussing rape trauma syndrome). 
63 “The witnesses’ testimony also grew more damning after authorities had con-
cluded, in the beginning of January, 1992, that Willingham was likely guilty of mur-
der. In Diane Barbee’s initial statement to authorities, she had portrayed Willingham 
as ‘hysterical,’ and described the front of the house exploding. But on January 4th, 
after arson investigators began suspecting Willingham of murder, Barbee suggested 
that he could have gone back inside to rescue his children, for at the outset she had 
seen only ‘smoke coming from out of the front of the house’—smoke that was not 
‘real thick.’” Id. at 49-50. 
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come more definitive.64 Moreover, similar “demeanor” evidence has 
proved unreliable in other arson cases.65 
 
D. MOTIVE EVIDENCE 
“[T]here was no clear motive. The children had life insurance 
policies, but they amounted to only fifteen thousand dollars, and 
Stacy’s grandfather, who had paid for them, was listed as the pri-
mary beneficiary.” 66  Moreover, neither Willingham nor his wife 
knew of the insurance until after the fire.67 
The only prosecution evidence concerning motive is found in 
the jailhouse informant’s testimony. Recall that Johnny Webb testi-
fied that Willingham had told him the fire was started to hide 
Willingham’s wife’s abuse of their children: “one of the babies were 
injured or dead or something like that.”68 There was no evidence in 
the record that either Willingham or his wife had ever abused their 
children, and the medical evidence concerning the autopsies did not 
support such a claim.69 (At the time, this motive may have made 
                                                          
 
 
 
64 This type of contextual bias is not limited to witnesses; everyone is subject to it, 
even professionals. See Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vul-
nerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74 (2006); D. Mi-
chael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic 
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2002). 
65 In the Willis case, discussed below, the “[w]itnesses maintained that Willis had 
acted suspiciously; he moved his car out of the yard, and didn’t show ‘any emotion,’ 
as one volunteer firefighter put it.” Grann, supra note 1, at 56. Similarly, in the fa-
mous Lime Street fire, witnesses “told authorities that Lewis seemed too calm during 
the fire and had never tried to get help.” Id. at 59. In both cases, the defendants were 
exonerated. 
66 Id. at 47. 
67  Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XIV, at 21 (testimony of Stacy 
Willingham). 
68 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 18 (testimony of Johnny Webb). 
69 After the trial, the prosecution would suggest another motive: “[A]s the local 
district attorney, Pat Batchelor, put it, ‘The children were interfering with his beer 
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sense to the prosecutor because Willingham’s wife Stacy supported 
him at trial.70) The prosecutor did not refer to this evidence in his 
closing statement. Instead, he demonized Willingham with the de-
meanor evidence. 
 
E. DEFENSE CASE 
Willingham did not take the stand. Apparently, he wanted to 
testify, but his lawyers thought he would not make a good wit-
ness.71 Willingham’s baby sitter, a defense witness, testified that 
Willingham would not hurt his children. Another defense witness, 
an incarcerated felon, was proffered in an attempt to impeach 
Webb, but his testimony was ruled hearsay. 
 
F. GUILT PHASE 
In sum, the demeanor evidence was not very probative,72 and 
the snitch testimony was not reliable. The key to the conviction (and 
arrest) was the expert testimony. No arson, no crime, no arrest.73  
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
drinking and dart throwing.’” Grann, supra note 1, at 47. This appears to be no more 
than speculation. 
70 The prosecution called her as a hostile witness in the penalty stage. She testified 
that Todd “never hurt those kids.” Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XIV, at 
5. Then, the prosecutor asked: “Well, are you the one who hurt the kids?” Id. There is 
no evidence in the record that anyone had ever hurt the children. The prosecutor also 
cross-examined her regarding life insurance. Id. at 20–21.  
71 “Dunn [defense counsel] told me that Willingham had wanted to testify, but 
Martin and Dunn thought that he would make a bad witness.” Grann, supra note 1, 
at 48. 
72 At most, it made Willingham appear callous and perhaps a coward, if one be-
lieves that a father should have entered the burning house. Willingham told investi-
gators that the smoke was too thick and that he was singed by flames. See also Grann, 
supra note 1, at 63 (Later Willingham “confessed to his parents that there was one 
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 III. PARDON & CLEMENCY PROCEEDINGS  
Willingham lost his appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in 1995.74 When other attempts at judicial redress also failed,75 
his execution date was set for February 17, 2004. At this point, his 
only hope was clemency, a process that is initiated in the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles before an application goes to the governor. By 
this time Willingham’s appellate attorney had contacted Dr. Gerald 
Hurst, a nationally recognized arson expert with a chemistry degree 
from Cambridge University. Working pro bono, Hurst reviewed the 
evidence (e.g., the fire marshal report, trial testimony, photographs, 
and a 52-minute video of the scene) and prepared a report, conclud-
ing that the arson testimony was invalid: 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
thing about the day of the fire he had lied about. He said that he had never actually 
crawled in the children’s room. ‘I just didn’t want people to think I was a coward,’ he 
said. [Dr.] Hurst told me, ‘People who have never been in a fire don’t understand 
why those who survive often can’t rescue the victims. They have no concept of what 
a fire is like.’”). 
73 The penalty phase included its own version of junk science. In this phase, the 
prosecution offered the testimony of Dr. James Grigson, who was known as “Dr. 
Death.” RON ROSENBAUM, TRAVELS WITH DR. DEATH AND OTHER UNUSUAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 206 (1991). Grigson testified that Willingham was a violent sociopath 
without ever interviewing him. One scholar labeled Grigson’s testimony in death 
penalty cases as “at the brink of quackery.” George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dan-
gerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 
(1977). As a prominent conservative author noted: One could favor the death penalty 
and “yet still recoil at the thought that a junk science fringe of psychiatry . . . could 
decide who will be sent to the gallows.” PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 220 (1991). 
74 Willingham, 897 S.W.2d at 354. The United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari from the direct appeal. Willingham v. Texas, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 946 (1995) (di-
rect appeal).   
75 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied post-conviction relief in 1997. Ex 
parte Willingham, No. 35, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Federal habeas challenges were 
also unsuccessful. Willingham v. Cockrell, No. 02-10133, 2003 WL 1107011 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 17, 2001), cert. denied, Willingham v. Dretke, 524 U.S. 917 (1998).  
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The fire investigation report of the Texas State Fire Mar-
shal’s Office in this case is a remarkable document. On first 
reading, a contemporary fire origin and cause analyst might 
well wonder how anyone could make so many critical er-
rors in interpreting the evidence. However, when the report 
is looked at in the context of its time and in light of a few 
key advances that have been made in the fire investigation 
field in the last dozen years, it becomes obvious that the re-
port more or less simply reflects the shortcomings in the 
state of the art prior to the beginning of serious efforts to in-
troduce standards and to test old theories that had previ-
ously been accepted on faith.76   
The five page report, which methodically examined the major 
deficiencies of the Willingham fire investigation, was submitted 
four days before the execution to the pardon board and to Governor 
Rick Perry. Notwithstanding this report, which raised substantial 
questions about the origin of the fire, the state of Texas executed 
Willingham by lethal injection as scheduled.77 Whether either the 
board or the Governor ever read the report is unclear.78 
                                                          
 
 
 
76 Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst, Ex parte Cameron Todd Willingham, Trial Court 
No. 24, 4670, (Tex Dist. Ct. Feb 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/death-by-fire/documents/hursts-
2004-report.html. 
77 Willingham’s lawyer also petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals, which 
ruled that the Hurst report was not newly discovered evidence.  
78 Grann, supra note 1, at 62 (“The Innocence Project obtained, through the Free-
dom of Information Act, all the records from the governor’s office and the board 
pertaining to Hurst’s report. ‘The documents show that they received the report, but 
neither office has any record of anyone acknowledging it, taking note of its signifi-
cance, responding to it, or calling any attention to it within the government,’ Barry 
Scheck said.”). See also Dave Mann, Fire and Innocence, TEX. OBSERVER, (Dec. 3, 2009), 
www.texasobserver.org/fire-and-innocence/ (“Because the governor’s office has refused 
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 IV.  TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION 
After Willingham’s execution, two seemingly unrelated statutes 
were enacted that ensured that the case would not die. In Novem-
ber 2004, Congress passed the Justice for All Act.79 Because of nu-
merous crime laboratory scandals,80 this legislation included a re-
quirement that each state receiving federal funds designate an enti-
ty to investigate forensic misconduct and incompetence. 
One of the major scandals involved the Houston crime labora-
tory.81 According to a state senator, “the validity of almost any case 
that has relied upon evidence produced by the lab is questiona-
ble.”82 As described by a later investigation, “the DNA Section was 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
to release relevant documents, it’s unclear what, if anything, the governor’s staff did 
with Hurst’s report or whether Perry ever saw it.”). 
79 “[A] certification that a government entity exists and an appropriate process is 
in place to conduct independent external investigations into allegations of serious 
negligence or misconduct substantially affecting the integrity of the forensic results 
committed by employees or contractors of any forensic laboratory system, medical 
examiner's office, coroner's office, law enforcement storage facility, or medical facili-
ty in the State that will receive a portion of the grant amount.” 42 U.S.C. § 3797k(4) 
(2004).  
80 See Giannelli, supra note 11.   
81 See IRMA RIOS ET. AL., QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDIT OF HOUSTON POLICE DEP’T 
CRIME LABORATORY–DNA/SEROLOGY SECTION (2002) (revealing a dysfunctional 
organization with serious contamination issues and an untrained staff using shoddy 
science) (on file with the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty). See also 
Nick Madigan, Houston’s Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2003, at A20 (reporting that operations were suspended after an audit found 
numerous problems, including poor calibration and maintenance of equipment, 
improper record keeping, and a lack of safeguards against contamination; “Among 
other problems, a leak in the roof was found to be a potential contaminant of sam-
ples on tables below.”); Giannelli, supra note 11, at 187-91 (discussing the Houston 
crime lab scandal).  
82  Rodney Ellis, Editorial, Want Tough on Crime? Start by Fixing HPD Lab., 
HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 5, 2004. Similarly, the chair of the legislative committee 
investigating the lab stated: “It’s a comedy of errors, except it’s not funny.” Adam 
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in shambles—plagued by a leaky roof, operating for years without a 
line supervisor, overseen by a technical leader who had no personal 
experience performing DNA analysis and who was lacking the 
qualifications required under the FBI standards, staffed by under-
paid and undertrained analysts, and generating mistake-ridden and 
poorly documented casework.”83 As a consequence, the state legis-
lature created the Texas Forensic Science Commission (TFSC) in 
2005.84 Among other duties, the Commission was tasked with inves-
tigating claims of professional negligence or misconduct as required 
by the federal act.  
 
A. INNOCENCE PROJECT COMPLAINT  
By this time, the Chicago Tribune, after reviewing the Hurst re-
port, began examining the Willingham case.85 The Tribune retained 
three independent experts to review the arson evidence, all of 
whom concluded that the evidence was seriously flawed.86 Next, 
the Innocence Project requested five experts to reexamine the case 
pro bono. These experts submitted a scathing forty-three page re-
port, finding that “each and every one of the indicators relied upon 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in Texas Could be Vast, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2003 (quoting state Representative Kevin Bailey).  
83 Third Report of the Independent Investigator for the Houston Police Dep’t 
Crime Laboratory and Property Room 5 (June 30, 2005). 
84 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 38.01(4)(a)(3) (2005) (among other duties, the Com-
mission should “investigate, in a timely manner, any allegation of professional neg-
ligence or misconduct that would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a 
forensic analysis conducted by an accredited laboratory, facility, or entity.”).  
85 See Mills & Possley, supra note 4. 
86 Two of the experts are authors of standard texts in the field. See JOHN DEHANN 
& DAVID J. ICOVE, KIRK’S FIRE INVESTIGATIONS (7th ed. 2011); LENTINI, supra note 17. 
The third expert, Kendall Ryland, was the Louisiana fire chief. Phillip Martin, Juror in 
Willingham Execution Case: “Maybe This Man Was Innocent”, BURNT ORANGE REPORT, 
Oct. 7, 2009. 
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have since been scientifically proven to be invalid.”87 The report 
even raised questions about Fire Marshal Vasquez’s general 
knowledge of the field. For example, Vasquez testified that of the 
1200 to 1500 fires he had investigated, most were arson.88 Yet, the 
Texas Fire Marshal Office reported that between 1980 and 2005, on-
ly fifty percent of investigated fires were arson.89 Vasquez also testi-
fied that fifty percent of his fires involved injuries and deaths.90 In 
contrast, between 1995 and 2005, the annual percentage of fires that 
resulted in death was 0.23% and the percentage of those resulting in 
injuries was 1.22%.91 
 
In May 2006, the Innocence Project petitioned the Commission 
to review the arson testimony in the Willingham and Ernest Ray 
Willis cases.92 The expert evidence in both cases was comparable, 
but Willis was lucky. His death penalty conviction was overturned 
on procedural grounds,93 and the prosecutor subsequently refused 
to reindict him after Dr. Hurst wrote the same type of critical report 
in Willis’s case that he had written in Willingham’s.94 Willis, who 
                                                          
 
 
 
87 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 3. One of these experts, John Lentini, was al-
so one of the experts consulted by the Chicago Tribune. Maurice Possley, Report: 
Inmate Wrongly Executed; Arson Experts Say Evidence in Texas Case Scientifically Invalid, 
CHI. TRIB., May, 3, 2006, at C1. 
88 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 228 (“With the exception of a 
few, most all of them.”). 
89 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 5-6. 
90 Willingham Transcript, supra note 16, vol. XI, at 228 (“Unfortunately, fires injure 
a lot of people, kill a lot of people. It’s about 50 percent.”). 
91 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 5-6. 
92 See Mary Alice Robbins, New-York Based Innocence Project Attacks Texas Arson 
Convictions, 22 TEX. LAWYER, May 8, 2006.  
93 See Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 WL 1812698, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 
09, 2004) (finding, among other deficiencies, ineffective assistance of counsel). 
94 “Ori T. White, then the district attorney in Fort Stockton, filed a certificate of ac-
tual innocence for Willis in the Court of Criminal Appeals.” Robbins, supra note 92.  
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had spent seventeen years on death row, was subsequently exoner-
ated on grounds of actual innocence.95  
The TFSC was not authorized to determine guilt or innocence. 
Instead, the Innocence Project argued that the State Fire Marshal’s 
Office should have reinvestigated the Willingham and other old 
arson cases, in which its experts had testified, after NFPA 921 was 
published in 1992—a full twelve years before Willingham’s execu-
tion.96 
 
B. THE BEYLER REPORT 
The Commission’s work was hampered from the beginning. In-
itially, the legislature did not provide funding, and then the Gover-
nor and Lieutenant Governor delayed the appointment of Commis-
sion members.97 When funding was finally appropriated, the Com-
mission spent a year formulating its procedures under the guidance 
of the Texas Attorney General’s Office. In late 2008, more than two 
years after the Innocence Project complaint was received, the Com-
mission retained an independent consultant, Dr. Craig Beyler, an-
other nationally recognized expert, to review the arson evidence.98 
                                                          
 
 
 
95 TFSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 13. 
96 See Letter from Innocence Project, to Texas Forensic Science Comm’n (Aug. 20, 
2010) (on file with the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty). 
97 See Mary Alice Robbins, Lack of Money, Members Stalled Launch of Crime Lab 
Commission, 22 TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 23, 2006 (“‘It’s obvious that somebody’s dragging 
their feet on this,’ says state Sen. Juan Hinojosa, Senate sponsor of H.B. 1068.”). Un-
der the statute, the Governor appoints four members—two forensic science experts, a 
prosecutor, and a defense attorney. The Lieutenant Governor appoints three mem-
bers—one each from University of Texas and Texas A&M University, specializing in 
clinical laboratory medicine, and one from Texas Southern University, specializing in 
pharmaceutical laboratory research. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 38.01(3)(a) (2005). 
98 The Commission voted to investigate the Willingham case at its August 15, 2008 
meeting.  
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Beyler’s fifty-one page report dissected the expert testimony, con-
cluding: 
The investigations of the Willis and Willingham fires did 
not comport with either the modern standard of care ex-
pressed by NFPA 921, or the standard of care expressed by 
fire investigation texts and papers in the period 1980-1992. 
The investigators had poor understandings of fire science 
and failed to acknowledge or apply the contemporaneous 
understanding of the limitations of fire indicators. Their 
methodologies did not comport with the scientific method 
or the process of elimination. A finding of arson could not 
be sustained based upon the standard of care expressed by 
NFPA, or the standard of care expressed by fire investiga-
tion texts and papers in the period 1980-1992.99 
 
C. GOVERNOR’S INTERVENTION 
Once Beyler’s report became public, a political firestorm erupt-
ed and Governor Perry, who was in the midst of a reelection battle, 
replaced Commission members two days before a scheduled hear-
ing to consider Dr. Beyler’s report.100 The newly appointed chair, 
                                                          
 
 
 
99 Craig L. Beyler, Analysis of the Fire Investigation Methods and Procedures 
Used in the Criminal Arson Cases Against Ernest Ray Willis and Cameron Todd 
Willingham, Aug. 17, 2009, at 51. Still another expert agreed. See Letter from Mark 
Goodson, Goodson Engineering, to Texas Forensic Science Comm’n (Sept. 23, 2009), 
at 1 (“I first off want to commend Dr. Beyler for an excellent report. His findings, in 
my view, are accurate. Moreover, the report agrees with the previous reports by both 
Lentini, Carpenter et al. and Dr. Hurst.”). 
100 See Christy Hoppe, Perry Defends Removing 3: He Says He’s Following Protocol, 
but Critics Believe He’s Derailing Arson Inquiry, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 2, 2009, at 
3A; Robbins, Fired Up, supra note 7 (“[Former Commissioner] Levy says he believes 
things went south for the commission after [former Chair] Bassett released Beyler’s 
report to the public in August as he was required by law to do.”). The meeting was 
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John Bradley, a prosecutor, cancelled the meeting.101 The timing of 
the Governor’s action raised the specter of a cover-up.102 Bradley 
then raised procedural objections, arguing for closed-door meet-
ings, training, development of written policies, and definitions of 
the terms “negligence” and “misconduct.”103 Bradley next prepared 
a report exculpating the Willingham fire investigators of any negli-
gence. The other Commission members, most of whom were scien-
tists, balked,104  thwarting Bradley’s “attempt to turn the science 
commission into a legalistic briar patch.” 105  Governor Perry re-
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
scheduled for October 2, 2009. Grann’s article had been published several weeks 
earlier. See Grann, supra note 1. 
101 Hoppe, Perry Defends Removing 3, supra note 100 (noting that Bradley was 
“known as one of the toughest law-and order prosecutors in the state”).  
102 See Emily, supra note 4 (“Perry’s replacements were seen by some as a political 
maneuver intended to change the outcome of the commission’s decision.”); Christy 
Hoppe, Perry Ousts Officials Before Arson Hearing: He’s Assailed as New Chair Delays 
Session on Flawed Case that Led to Execution, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 1, 2009, at 1A; 
David Mann, Fire and Innocence, TEX. OBSERVER, Dec. 2, 2009 (“Then in late Septem-
ber, Perry booted three members off of the Texas Forensic Science Commission, 
which was investigating the Willingham and Willis cases, just three days before a 
crucial hearing on scientists’ findings. Perry’s new appointees promptly canceled the 
hearing and have yet to reschedule it. Even conservative commentators cried cover-
up, suggesting that Perry, in a tough battle for re-election, was trying to subvert an 
investigation that might prove he oversaw the execution of an innocent man.”). 
103 See Robert T. Garrett, Forensics Panel Faulted: Former Chairman Says Overhaul 
May Delay Arson Review for Years, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Nov. 12, 2009 (Bradley 
faulted former chairman Sam Bassett, saying he “utterly failed to adopt even a defi-
nition of negligence or misconduct.”); CSI: Texas: Governor Shakes Up Commission, 
Covers Tracks, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Nov. 17, 2009 (Bradley “canceled the meeting [with 
fire expert Craig Beyler] and raised a number of issues about the commission’s lack 
of rules and procedures.”). 
104 See Emily, supra note 4 (“The Texas Forensic Science Commission rebelled Fri-
day against its head commissioner, refusing to accept his draft report clearing arson 
investigators of misconduct or negligence in a 1991 fatal fire where flawed science 
was used to determine the blaze was intentionally set.”). 
105 See Rick Casey, The Revolt of the Scientists: No Legalistic Briar Patch Allowed, 
HOUS. CHRONICLE, Jan. 31, 2010, at B1. See also Rick Casey, A Win for Bradley, and 
Another Loss: Panel Worried About Funding, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Feb. 3, at B1 (“[T]he 
seven scientists on the nine-member commission rebelled at a set of policies and 
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sponded by saying that “‘the evidence shows Willingham to be 
guilty,’ and [dismissing] the work of Beyler and other arson experts. 
The Governor declined to specify . . . what evidence he believes 
backs up the case.” 106  Before the Commission could reconvene, 
Governor Perry was reelected. By this time, the Fire Marshal’s Of-
fice and the city of Corsicana were challenging the TFSC’s jurisdic-
tion to review old cases.107 
At its January 7, 2011 meeting, the Commission finally heard 
from Dr. Beyler, who once again reiterated his position that the 
Willingham investigation was seriously flawed and the cause of the 
fire should have been designated as “undetermined.”108 In his view, 
the investigators failed to eliminate natural or accidental causes, in 
violation of professional standards. 109  Another arson expert, Dr. 
John DeHaan, author of a standard text in the field,110 agreed with 
Beyler. According to DeHaan, “‘everything that was documented 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
procedures presented by Bradley that would have given him formidable powers as 
chairman, including naming members and chairs of three standing committees and 
of ad-hoc committees that will direct the investigations of alleged failures at police 
labs and other agencies.”). 
106 Christy Hoppe & Gromer Jeffers Jr., Arson Expert: Furor over Texas Forensics 
Masks Dangerous Trend, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 15, 2009. See also Steve Mills, 
Texas Execution: Statements by Gov. Rick Perry Others Don’t Align with Facts, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 19, 2009, at C12. 
107 Letter from Terry Jacobson, City Attorney, to Leigh Tomlin, Comm’n Coordi-
nator, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Aug. 20, 2010) (“[T]he commission lacks the au-
thority to even review this matter.”) [hereinafter SFMO Letter]. 
108 Rick Casey, Willingham: Scientists vs. Lawyers, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Jan. 10, 2010. 
109 Erin Mulvaney, National Experts Criticize States’s Study of Fatal 1991 House Fire, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 2011. See also Aziza Musa, Arson Experts Testify in 
Willingham Investigation, TEX. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2011 (“Beyler accused the original investi-
gators of ignoring eyewitnesses, whose testimony contradicted the arson determina-
tion.”); Allan Turner, Arson Probe that Led to Corsicana Man’s Execution Assailed, HOUS. 
CHRONICLE, Jan. 8, 2011 (“Beyler also faulted Vasquez for failing to investigate the 
possibility that the fire had been set by one of the children or by an intruder. Rather 
than systematically explore possible causes such as an electrical short, Coricana au-
thorities ‘shoveled out the room and put it out the window,’ Beyler charged.”). 
110 See supra note 86. 
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post-fire was consistent with accidental rather than intentional fire. 
There was no basis for concluding that this was arson.’ DeHaan 
said he was dismayed that the state fire marshal’s office stood by 
the conclusion of the investigators.”111 In contrast, Ed Salazar, a 
lawyer with the State Fire Marshal Office, defended the fire investi-
gation. One report put it this way: “Salazar became impassioned 
with his criticism of the opposing expert, but he was short on analy-
sis. ‘It was embarrassing,’ said one scientist on the commission af-
terward.”112 Buddy Wood, a senior investigator with the Houston 
Fire Department, testified that the investigators were not negligent. 
However, he also stated that he could not determine the cause of 
the fire because he had not gone to the scene.113 
On January 28, 2011 the Commission requested a legal opinion 
regarding its jurisdiction from the state Attorney General’s Office.114  
 
D. TFSC REPORT 
While awaiting the Attorney General’s response, the Commis-
sion issued a limited report—one that did not directly deal with the 
Willingham and Willis cases.115 Nevertheless, the report’s recom-
                                                          
 
 
 
111 Mulvaney, supra note 109. 
112 Casey, supra note 108.  
113 By this time, Willingham’s family along with the Innocence Project sought a 
judicial inquiry into Willingham’s conviction. Petition to Convene a Court of Inquiry 
and For Declaration to Remedy Injury to Mr. Willingham’s Reputation under the 
Texas Constitution, 299th Dist. Court, Travis County, Tex., Sept. 24, 2010. See also 
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. art. 52.01 (1995) (courts of inquiry). The prosecutors re-
sponded by asking the judge to recuse himself and then filed a writ of mandamus on 
the recusal issue. Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Motion 
for Immediate Stay, 3d Jud. Dist. Court of Appeals, Oct. 14, 2010. 
114 Letter from John Bradley, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n, to Greg Abbott, Attorney 
Gen., Tex. (Aug. 28, 2010) (on file). 
115 Controversially, the Attorney General eventually opined that the Commission 
lacked jurisdiction. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0866, at *4 (2011), 2011 WL 
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mendations and statements indicated that the Willingham arson 
investigation was seriously flawed. Its first recommendation was 
“that fire investigators adhere to the standards of NFPA 921.”116 In 
addition, the report reviewed a number of the arson indicators that 
were used in the Willingham and Willis cases. Reviewing Vasquez’s 
testimony, the report undermined his opinions concerning V-
patterns as an indicator of origin, pour patterns, low/deep burning, 
multiple separate points of origin, spalling, burn intensity, and 
crazed glass.117 It also observed that, “testimony, such as Vasquez’s 
response to a question regarding Willingham’s state of mind, is an 
example of the type of testimony that experts should avoid as fall-
ing outside of their field of expertise.”118 Surprisingly, the report 
even encouraged lawyers to “aggressively pursue admissibility 
hearings in arson cases.”119 
The State Fire Marshal’s Office was criticized as well. That of-
fice had submitted a letter that included the following statement: 
“In reviewing documents and standards in place then and now, we 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
4352017 (concluding that the TFSC cannot investigate incidents before September 1, 
2005, long after the Willingham incident). The TFSC would eventually accept the 
Attorney General’s reading of the statute. See TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM’N, 
ADDENDUM TO THE APRIL 15, 2011 REPORT OF THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE 
COMMISSION, WILLINGHAM/WILLIS INVESTIGATION, at 3–4 (Oct. 28, 2011), available at 
http://content.news8austin.com/auscontent/files/WillinghamWillisReport.pdf. See 
also Ryan M. Goldstein, Note, Improving Forensic Science Through State Oversight, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 225, 245 (2011) (referring to the AG opinion as a “narrow interpretation” 
of the jurisdictional statute). 
116 TFSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 39. Other recommendations included enhanced 
certification, comprehensive reports, retention of records, and standards in testifying. 
Id. at 39–52. 
117 Id. at 21–28.  
118 Id. at 36. 
119 Id. at 48. 
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stand by the original investigator’s report and conclusions.”120 In 
response, the report commented: “This appears to be an untenable 
position in light of advances in fire science. The fires in these cases 
occurred two decades ago; there are few circumstances in which an 
investigation could not be improved with the benefit of twenty 
years of controlled scientific experiment and practical experi-
ence.”121 
Significantly, the report also pointed out that forensic disci-
plines have a “(1) duty to correct; (2) duty to inform; (3) duty to be 
transparent; and (4) [duty to] implement[] corrective action” when 
new scientific knowledge develops.122 
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
There is little dispute that the arson evidence in Willingham’s 
case, based on myths that had permeated fire investigations for 
years, was invalid. Every independent expert, including the top 
experts in the country, has concluded that there was no evidence of 
arson.123 Without the arson evidence, there never would have been 
                                                          
 
 
 
120 Letter from Paul Maldonado, State Fire Marshal, to Leigh Tomlin, Comm’n 
Coordinator, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Aug. 20, 2010) (on file with the New York 
University Journal of Law and Liberty) (emphasis added). 
121 TFSC REPORT, supra note 39, at 16. 
122 Id. at 41. 
123 “Even Edward Cheever, one of the state deputy fire marshals who had assisted 
in the original investigation of the 1991 fire, acknowledged that Hurst’s criticism was 
valid. ‘At the time of the Corsicana fire, we were still testifying to things that aren’t 
accurate today,’ he said. ‘They were true then, but they aren’t now. ‘Hurst,’ he add-
ed, ‘was pretty much right on. . . . We know now not to make those same assump-
tions.’” Mills & Possley, supra note 4. After the issue became politicized, Cheever 
“told the [Texas Forensic Science Commission] he had been misquoted by a Chicago 
Tribune reporter who wrote that he admitted the standards Vasquez used now may 
be considered outdated.” Turner, supra note 109. Assistant Chief Fogg, however, has 
not changed his opinion. See Frontline: Death by Fire, supra note 5. 
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an arrest, much less a trial or execution. The other evidence intro-
duced at trial (e.g., jail-informant testimony and demeanor evi-
dence) was suspect.124 While Willingham was executed, Willis, who 
was convicted on comparable evidence, was exonerated after 
spending seventeen years on death row. 
Although NFPA 921 was published in 1992 just weeks after 
Willingham’s trial, many of its findings had been reported during 
the prior decade. After NFPA 921 was published, the State Fire 
Marshal’s Office became aware of its contents125 but did not take 
corrective action in old cases during the dozen years Willingham 
waited on death row. Indeed, the Office still maintains it did every-
thing right. 
Moreover, once Dr. Hurst’s report was made available to them, 
the Texas pardon board and Governor Perry had the opportunity to 
stay the execution to investigate further. They did not. Although the 
United States Supreme Court has called clemency the “failsafe” 
                                                          
 
 
 
124 Texas officials have suggested that Willingham was guilty, even if the arson ev-
idence was flawed. The statements of Willingham’s wife, Stacy, are cited as support 
for this view. At the trial, she testified at the penalty stage that she believed him to be 
innocent. See supra note 70. After the trial, she worked for his exoneration. See Grann, 
supra note 1, at 47, 49 (Stacy “wrote to Ann Richards, then the governor of Texas, 
saying, ‘I know him in ways that no one else does when it comes to our children. 
Therefore, I believe that there is no way he could have possibly committed this 
crime.’” She reported to “investigators that even though Willingham hit her he had 
never abused the children—‘Our kids were spoiled rotten,’ she said—and she did 
not believe that Willingham could have killed them.”). She later remarried. For over 
a decade, she did not visit him on death row. At some point she changed her mind. 
Recently, she said that he had confessed to her in their last meeting immediately 
before his execution. Yet, “[i]n their final meeting . . . he did not confess, she told the 
Tribune.” Mills & Possley, supra note 4. 
125 See SFMO Letter, supra note 107 (“The guidelines NFPA 921 set out were used 
by the State Fire Marshal prior to NFPA 921's initial publication”; “The SFMO staff 
began referencing and received training on NFPA 921 almost immediately after its 
initial publication in 1992.”). 
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procedure in death penalty cases, 126  the Texas procedure was 
known as “death by fax” because the pardon board is not required 
to meet or discuss a case;127 each member can vote by fax.128 “Be-
tween 1976 and 2004, when Willingham filed his petition, the State 
of Texas had approved only one application for clemency from a 
person on death row.”129 In another case, a Texas appellate judge 
wrote: “Applicant’s complaints about the inadequacies of our Texas 
executive clemency procedures are not unheard of. Not only are 
they not unheard of, but her complaints are pretty much accurate. I 
would say that clemency law in Texas is a legal fiction at best.”130 
                                                          
 
 
 
126 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993). See also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Reversal of an erroneous conviction on ap-
peal or on habeas, or the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through executive 
clemency, demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success. Those devices 
are part and parcel of the multiple assurances that are applied before a death sen-
tence is carried out.”); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (“Among its benign if too-often ignored objects, the clemency power can correct 
injustices that the ordinary criminal process seems unable or unwilling to consider . . 
. .”).  
127 Grann, supra note 1, at 62 (“The vote was unanimous. . . . [T]he board deliber-
ates in secret, and its member are not bound by any specific criteria. The board 
members did not even have to review Willingham’s materials, and usually don’t 
debate a case in person; rather, they cast their votes by fax—a process that has be-
come known as ‘death by fax.’”).  
128 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.047(b) (West 2004) (“The members of the board 
are not required to meet as a body to perform the members’ duties in clemency mat-
ters”). In a 2002 case, a criminal defendant alleged that “only one live clemency hear-
ing has been held in the past thirty years.” Lagrone v. Cockrell, No. Civ.A.4:99–CV–
0521–G, 2002 WL 1968246, at *23 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2002).  
129 Grann, supra note 1, at 62. Texas’s lackluster reputation for reviewing death-
penalty cases includes the conduct of Sharon Keller, presiding judge of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals, who refused to keep the clerk’s office open past five o’clock to 
permit a last-minute petition by an inmate executed later that night. See Gretel C. 
Kovach, Mixed Opinions of a Judge Accused of Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at 
A14. 
130 Ex parte Tucker, 973 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Overstreet, J., con-
curring). See also Steve Woods, Comment, A System Under Siege: Clemency and the 
Texas Death Penalty After the Execution of Gary Graham, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1145, 1146 
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Then, by interfering with the work of the Texas Forensic Science 
Commission, Governor Perry and his allies undermined a process 
intended to improve expert testimony in criminal prosecutions. 
Congress enacted the requirement that each state designate an enti-
ty to investigate forensic misconduct and incompetence because 
few states had such a procedure and the experience in the states 
varied.131 Thus, the TFSC’s decision to review the Willingham case 
was historic—one of the first investigations by a forensic commis-
sion in the country. Unfortunately, the Fire Marshal’s Office’s re-
sistance to admitting prior mistakes and the Governor’s interven-
tion undermined the Commission’s work. There are still inmates in 
Texas prisons who were convicted on the same flawed arson evi-
dence.132 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
(2001) (“Critics are enraged at the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles’s record of 
only recommending one individual for clemency since 1995. . . . The execution of 
Gary Graham in Huntsville, Texas, in June of 2000, cast a worldwide spotlight on 
Texas and its clemency procedure and has cemented the need for the state to exam-
ine its methods to determine whether any improvements can, or even should, be 
made.”).  
131 Until recently, only New York had established a Commission on Forensic Sci-
ence. It is authorized to (1) develop minimum standards and a program of accredita-
tion for all state laboratories, (2) establish minimum qualifications for laboratory 
directors and other personnel, and (3) approve forensic laboratories for the perfor-
mance of specific forensic methodologies. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-b (McKinney 2012). 
See Giannelli, supra note 11, at 170. 
132 See generally Mann, supra note 78 (discussing the cases of Curtis Severns, Ed 
Graf, and Alfredo Guardiola). 
